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ABSTRACT
Interest in semi-autonomous systems (SAS) is growing rapidly as a
paradigm to deploy autonomous systems in domains that require
occasional reliance on humans. This paradigm allows service robots
or autonomous vehicles to operate at varying levels of autonomy
and offer safety in situations that require human judgment. We
propose an introspective model of autonomy that is learned and
updated online through experience and dictates the extent to which
the agent can act autonomously in any given situation. We define
a competence-aware system (CAS) that explicitly models its own
proficiency at different levels of autonomy and the available human
feedback. A CAS learns to adjust its level of autonomy based on
experience to maximize overall efficiency, factoring in the cost of
human assistance. We analyze the convergence properties of CAS
and provide experimental results for robot delivery and autonomous
driving domains that demonstrate the benefits of the approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in artificial intelligence and robotics has enabled
the deployment of increasingly autonomous systems in complex un-
structured domains such as space exploration [9, 17], autonomous
underwater vehicles [4, 11, 21], service robots [10, 12], and, most
notably, autonomous vehicles [2, 3, 7]. Common to these settings is
that the autonomous systems are required to operate without super-
vision over extended periods of time while they rely on approximate
models of the environment that may not be sufficient for handling
every situation [19]. Consequently, autonomous systems need to
rely on various forms of human supervision and assistance [6, 31].
Proc. of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2020), B. An, N. Yorke-Smith, A. El Fallah Seghrouchni, G. Sukthankar (eds.),
, May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand. © 2020 International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
The vast majority of autonomous systems under development
are in fact semi-autonomous systems (SAS) that can operate au-
tonomously under certain conditions, but may require human in-
tervention or aid in order to achieve their assigned goals [31]. For
example, a space exploration rover may suspend operation and wait
for a new plan from the command center when its wheel encounters
unexpected resistance. An autonomous car may request that the
driver take over when lane demarcation is lost. The reliance on
humans in these situations is indicative of the limited competence
of the autonomous system. Human response could come in different
forms that correspond to different limitations of the autonomous
system. For example, allowing a system to operate autonomously
under human supervision indicates a higher level of competence
relative to a system that must first present its plan and get approval
for every action before the action is executed.
We propose to represent the competence of a semi-autonomous
system using different levels of autonomy, each associated with
distinct forms of human involvement. Intuitively, we expect higher
competence to imply that the necessary human involvement re-
quires less effort or is less costly. The resulting competence-aware
system (CAS) can operate in multiple levels of autonomy, each
of which is associated with different restrictions on autonomous
operation and different forms of human assistance that compensate
for the restricted abilities of the system. We further associate with
each type of human assistance a unique set of feedback signals, the
likelihood of which can be learned over time by the system.
Determining the exact competence of an autonomous system
at design time is very difficult, particularly when the environment
is not fully specified. For example, an autonomous vehicle may
be initially authorized to operate in a fully autonomous mode on
highways only during daytime and clear weather. Hence, an ini-
tial level of competence could be determined during testing and
evaluation, but adjustments must be made when the system is de-
ployed. Even when developers aim to err on the side of caution and
define a lower level of autonomy as the default, it is also possible
to unintentionally infer from initial testing that the system is more
competent than it really is [18, 22]. Therefore, developing mecha-
nisms to explicitly represent, reason about, and adjust the level of
autonomy is an important challenge in artificial intelligence.
Our objective in this paper is three-pronged: (1) to develop a
formal representation of competence using distinct levels of auton-
omy and distinct forms of human assistance, (2) to learn to optimize
autonomy based on human assistive actions, and (3) to develop a
competence-aware planning framework that factors in the system’s
knowledge about its own competence in order to reduce unneces-
sary reliance on humans. Intuitively, the highest level of autonomy
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that a system can handle without human overrides captures its
“true competence.” Our goal is to introduce learning mechanisms
that allow the system to converge on its true competence and
thereby minimize its reliance on human assistance. We present a
formal model and algorithms for implementing a CAS, a theoretical
analysis of the model, and experimental results demonstrating the
effectiveness of our approach in simulation as well as integration
with an autonomous vehicle (AV) prototype.
2 RELATEDWORK
There has been substantial work on planning for semi-autonomous
systems over the last two decades, particularly on various forms of
adjustable autonomy. Adjustable autonomy refers to the ability of
an autonomous system to alter its level of autonomy during plan
execution, often by dynamically imposing or relaxing constraints
on the extent of actions it can perform autonomously in a human-
agent team [1, 8, 14–16, 20, 23, 30]. Our work adds two important
capabilities to systems with adjustable autonomy: (1) explicitly
modeling multiple forms of human feedback and the ability to
learn about the agent’s competence from feedback, and (2) learning
predictive models of human feedback to allow the agent to converge
on its level-optimal autonomy over time.
For autonomous vehicles in particular, SAE International has
developed five distinct levels of autonomy that have become an
industry standard [5]. Our AV example uses levels of autonomy
inspired by that standards and our experience with an AV prototype.
The problem of safely transferring control from automation
to a human in semi-autonomous systems [31] has been studied,
particularly in the context of autonomous vehicles [26]. While such
transfer mechanisms are highly relevant to our work, for the sake
of clarity we do not model these transitions explicitly in this paper
and instead focus on competence modeling and identifying the best
level of autonomy in each situation.
Our work relates to broader research on long-term autonomy [27],
particularly symbiotic autonomy [6, 24, 25] and human-in-the-loop
AI systems [29]. Symbiotic autonomy allows collaborative robots
(CoBots) to proactively seek external help to overcome their lim-
itations. This work takes symbiotic autonomy to the next level,
allowing agents to learn a model of their limitations from human
feedback and consider the most cost-effective form of human assis-
tance for each situation based on the acquired models. Similarly,
the issue of authority sharing has been studied in human-robot
systems [13], however in our case we assume that the human is
always the authority, never the autonomous system.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We start with a description of the general problem. Consider an
autonomous agent that can operate in and plan for multiple levels
of autonomous operation, each of which consists of different forms
of human feedback. In particular, this paper focuses on agents that
use the following three models: a domain model (DM) that describes
the environment that the agent is operating in, an autonomy model
(AM) that describes the levels of autonomy the agent can operate
in, where it is allowed to do so, and what the respective utilities
are, and a human feedback model (HM) that describes the types of
feedback that the agent can receive from the human, how costly
each type of feedback is, and how likely the agent is to receive it.
Figure 1 represents an overview of a competence-aware system
with specific levels of autonomy and feedback signals that we use
throughout the rest of the paper as a running example.
3.1 Domain Model
The domain model (DM) describes the environment in which the
agent operates, most notably the transition and cost dynamics of
the environment with respect to the agent. In this paper, we model
this as a Stochastic Shortest Path (SSP) problem, a formal decision-
making model for reasoning in stochastic environments where the
objective is to find the least-cost path from a start state to a goal
state. An SSP is a tuple ⟨S,A,T ,C, s0, sд⟩, where S is a finite set of
states,A is a finite set of actions,T : S×A×S → [0, 1] represents the
probability of reaching state s ′ ∈ S after performing action a ∈ A in
state s ∈ S ,C : S ×A→ R+ represents the expected immediate cost
of performing action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S , s0 is an initial state, and
sд is a goal state such that ∀a ∈ A,T (sд ,a, sд) = 1 ∧C(sд ,a) = 0.
A solution to an SSP is a policy π : S → A that indicates that
action π (s) ∈ A should be taken in state s ∈ S . A policy π induces the
value functionV π : S → R that represents the expected cumulative
cost V π (s) of reaching sд from state s following the policy π . An
optimal policy π∗ minimizes the expected cumulative cost V ∗(s0)
from the initial state s0.
3.2 Autonomy Model
The autonomy model (AM) captures the extent of autonomous op-
eration that the agent can perform, i.e., both the actual different
forms of autonomous operation as well as when each is allowed by
some external constraint. We formally represent this by the tuple
⟨L,κ, µ⟩, where L = {l0, ..., ln } is the set of levels of autonomy
where each level li corresponds to some set of constraints on the
system’s autonomous operation. The constraints are reflected by
the form of human involvement; for example, in supervised auton-
omy a person must monitor the system and override any actions
deemed unsafe or undesirable. We do not restrict the number of
levels and forms of human involvement allowed in an autonomy
model. Intuitively, the higher the level of autonomy, the lower the
cost of human involvement, although that is not a requirement of
the autonomy model.
Without loss of generality, we assume that L is a fully ordered
set, although in general the theory extends to any graph in which
two levels are connected when the level of autonomy could change
from one to the other. In Figure 1, these levels correspond to no
autonomy, where the agent needs a human to perform the action
manually, verified autonomy, where the agent must query for and re-
ceive explicit approval before even attempting the action, supervised
autonomy, where the agent can perform the action autonomously
as long as there is a human supervising the agent who can inter-
vene if something is going wrong, and unsupervised autonomy, that
represents fully autonomous operation.
Next, κ : S ×A→ P(L) is the autonomy profile mapping states
s ∈ S and actions a ∈ A to a subset of L (note that P(L) denotes
the powerset of L), prescribing constraints on the allowed levels
of autonomy for any situation. These can be hard constraints on
the system (i.e. technical, legal, or ethical) or can be temporary
conservative constraints that can be updated over time as the system
improves. In Figure 1, κ constrains the space of all policies Π so that
the system is only allowed to follow a policy that never violates κ.
Finally, µ : S × L ×A × L → R represents the cost of autonomy of
performing action a ∈ A at level l ′ ∈ L given that the agent is in
state s ∈ S and just operated in level l ∈ L in the previous state.
3.3 Human Feedback Model
The human feedback model (HM) describes the agent’s knowledge
about, and predictions of, its interactions with the human. We for-
mally represent this as the tuple ⟨Σ, λ, ρ,τ ⟩, where Σ = {σ0, ...,σn }
is the set of possible feedback signals the agent can receive from
the human, λ : S × L ×A × L → ∆ |Σ | is the feedback profile that
represents the probability of receiving signal σ when performing
action a ∈ A at level l ′ ∈ L given that the agent is in state s ∈ S
and just operated in level l ∈ L, ρ : S × L × A × L → R+ is the
human cost function and represents the positive cost to the human
of performing action a ∈ A at level l ′ ∈ L given that the agent is in
state s ∈ S and just operated in level l ∈ L, and τ : S ×A→ ∆ |S | is
the human state transition function that represents the probability
of the human taking the agent to state s ′ ∈ S when the agent at-
tempted to perform action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S but the human took
over control.
In practice, the feedback profile λ and the human state transition
function τ are assumed to be unknown a priori, so the agent must
estimate them based on previous data it has gathered in the same or
similar situations. In Figure 1, after the action execution stage, the
system will record the feedback it receives from the human, if any,
and use that to update these model components. In practice, the
feedback signals may also not be instantaneous, and in some cases
could require a complex process of transferring control to and from
a human over the course of an indefinite amount of time, where el-
ements of the transfer process such as the communication interface
are individually important. The problem of transfer of control in
semi-autonomous systems has been separately studied [26], how-
ever for the sake of clarity we do not model this process explicitly
in this work as we are focusing on the orthogonal problem of levels
of autonomy and competence modeling.
4 COMPETENCE-AWARE SYSTEMS
Given the three model components above, we can now define a
competence-aware system (CAS) that combines the three models
into one formal decision-making framework. A CAS therefore rep-
resents a planning problem that accounts for the different levels of
autonomy available to the agent and factors the agent’s expecta-
tions regarding the likelihood and cost of human intervention. The
objective of a solution to a CAS planning problem is to create a cost-
effective plan that minimizes the cost of reaching the goal, including
the cost of human assistance. Hence, the CAS uses the autonomy
model to proactively generate plans that operate across multiple
levels of autonomy, by leveraging the human feedback model to
predict the likelihood of different feedback signals to optimize the
level of autonomy and minimize the reliance on humans.
Figure 1: A competence-aware system with four levels
of autonomy—verified, supervised, unsupervised, and no
autonomy—and four type of feedback signals—approval, dis-
approval, override, and no feedback.
4.1 Model Definition
CAS combines the domain model, autonomy model, and human
feedback model into one sequential decision-making framework
where the objective is to generate a policy that minimizes the ex-
pected cost of accomplishing a task. Hence we formally represent
CAS as the following extension of an SSP:
Definition 4.1. A competence-aware system S is represented
by the tuple ⟨S,A,T ,C, s0, sд⟩, where:
• S = S × L is a set of factored states such that S is the set of
domain states and L is the levels of autonomy.
• A = A × L is a set of factored actions such that A is the set
of domain actions and L is the levels of autonomy.
• T : S ×A→ ∆ |S | is a transition function comprised of a state
transition function Tl : S ×A→ ∆ |S | for each level l ∈ L.
• C : S × A → R+ is a positive cost function comprised of
C : S ×A→ R+, µ : S ×A→ R, and ρ : S ×A→ R+.
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state such that s0 = ⟨s0, l⟩ for some l ∈ L.
• sд ∈ S is the goal state such that sд = ⟨sд , l⟩ for some l ∈ L.
A solution to a given CAS is a policy π that maps states and
levels s ∈ S to actions and levels a ∈ A, where the space of policies
that the agent can consider is restricted by the autonomy profile κ
in the following way.
Let a = ⟨a, l⟩. Given s = ⟨s, l ′⟩ ∈ S , we say that (s,a) is allowed
if l ∈ κ(s,a), and a policy π is allowed if for every s ∈ S , (s,π (s)) is
allowed. We denote the set of policies π ∈ Π that are allowed given
κ as Πκ ⊆ Π and require that any policy returned by solving the
CAS, π∗, is always taken from argminπ ∈Πκ V
π (s0).
4.2 Sample CAS
As noted earlier, we focus on the CAS illustrated in Figure 1, which
represents a class of CAS with four distinct levels of autonomy and
four feedback signals. Recent work on autonomous vehicles [28]
and autonomous mobile robots [22] suggests that this class of CAS
represents a wide range of autonomous systems. In Figure 1, the
policy π produces an action a and a level l for every state s . l dictates
the manner in which the system carries out the action a, and the
autonomy profile κ restricts the levels the π can return.
Formally, let L = {l0, l1, l2, l3} where
• l0 is no autonomy, which requires direct human aid in the
form of manual control.
• l1 is verified autonomy, which requires the agent to query for
and receive human approval prior to executing the action.
• l2 is supervised autonomy, which requires a human to be
present and available to intervene in the case of failure.
• l3 is unsupervised autonomy, which involves no human in
the loop at all.
Let Σ = {∅, ⊕, ⊖, ⊘}, corresponding to no feedback, approval, disap-
proval, and override respectively. Furthermore, we assume that ⊕
and ⊖ can only be received in l1, and ⊘ and ∅ only in l2.
We can now specify the state transition function of this CAS.
Given s,a, and s ′, we define T as follows:
T (s,a, s ′) =

τ (s,a, s ′), if l = l0,
λ(⊕)T (s,a, s ′) + λ(⊖)[s = s ′], if l = l1,
λ(∅)T (s,a, s ′) + λ(⊘)τ (s,a, s ′), if l = l2,
T (s,a, s ′), if l = l3,
(1)
where λ(·) = λ(·|s,a) and [·] denotes Iverson brackets.
We further define C(s,a) as follows:
C(s,a) = д (C(s,a), µ(s,a), ρ(s,a)) . (2)
whereд is any cost aggregation function onC, µ, and ρ, the simplest
case of which is a weighted summation of the three values.
Intuitively, Eqn. 1 states that when the agent operates in l0, it
follows the transition dynamics of the human who takes control.
When operating in l1, the probability it arrives in state s ′ is the
probability it is approved to take the action times the probability
that it succeeds following T plus the probability that it is disap-
proved and the state is the same. In l2, the probability it arrives
in state s ′ is the probability it succeeds following T without any
human intervention plus the probability that the human overrides
it and takes it to that state. When the agent operates in l3, it follows
the transition dynamics of the domain model DM.
4.3 Gated Exploration
A fundamental component of the CAS model is the ability to adjust
its autonomy profile over time using what the system has learned,
and to optimize its autonomy by reducing unnecessary reliance
on human assistance. However, before operating in a new level of
autonomy, the system may have no knowledge of how the human
will interact with it in that level, i.e., the feedback profile in that new
level may be initialized by default to some baseline distribution. As
a result, it is necessary that the system explore levels of autonomy
that it has reason to believe may be more cost effective than its
current level, so that it may generate the data it needs to improve
the accuracy and confidence of its feedback profile in those levels.
However, allowing a system to alter its own autonomy profile
can lead to severe consequences in the real world if not done care-
fully. Therefore, we propose an extension to traditional exploration
methods used in reinforcement learning called gated exploration,
in which the system must obtain permission from a human before
exploring a new (disallowed) level of autonomy. Hence, the system
must first query the human to update the autonomy profile to allow
such exploration. This way, the exploration of disallowed levels is
gated by a human authority to prevent the agent from randomly
executing dangerous actions.
Although many exploration-exploitation strategies may work in
our context, we use a variant of ϵ-greedy where ϵ is not fixed but
instead proportional to the relative expected cost of performing a
given action in each level of autonomy. More formally, the proba-
bility of exploring a level l ′ adjacent to the current level l in L is
proportional to the softmax of the negative q-value of operating in
level l ′ over all levels adjacent to l .
4.4 Autonomy Profile Initialization
Because we restrict the system to choose policies from Πκ , if the
autonomy profile κ is altered, so too is the space of allowed policies;
in particular this means that the optimal policy is, intuitively, only
as good as κ. Hence there is a trade-off when setting the initial
constraints on the allowed autonomy of the system, i.e., κ.
One can take a conservative approach and constrain the system
significantly, for instance setting |κ(s,a)| = 1 so that a single level
is deterministically selected for every (s,a) ∈ S ×A, reducing the
problem complexity to solving the underlying domain model. How-
ever, doing so risks a globally suboptimal policy with respect to L
and may, depending on the initial κ, make reaching the globally
optimal policy impossible. On the other extreme, one can take a
risky approach and not constrain the system at all a priori, leaving
the decision of choosing the level of autonomy completely up to the
system. This approach, while necessarily containing the optimal
policy (subject to the agent’s model) is naturally slower due to the
larger policy space and inherently less safe as the agent can take
actions in undesirable levels.
We propose that in practice, the ideal initialization is somewhere
in the middle; κ should be less constraining in situations where
the expected cost of failure is relatively low, and more constrain-
ing in situations where it is high. For instance, in an autonomous
vehicle, κ should be more constraining initially in situations involv-
ing pedestrians, poor visibility, or chaotic environments such as
large intersections with multiple vehicles; however, initial testing
may indicate that driving along a highway is low-risk and may not
require a highly constraining κ.
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we first state several key properties of a CAS and
prove the following claims:
First, we show that under standard convergence assumptions,
the feedback profile λ will converge to the human’s true feedback
distribution. Second, we show that if feasible, the agent’s policy π
will converge to its competence regardless of how λ is initialized,
given a reasonable initialization of κ.
5.1 Properties of a CAS
We will refer to the human authority henceforth by the notation
H , and we make the following assumptions about them. First, we
assume that the human authority is ϵ-consistent, which means that
given two identical queries, the probability that they respond dif-
ferently given no new information is bounded by some 0 < ϵ ≪ 1.
Second, we begin by assuming that the human authority’s feedback
signals come from an underlying stationary distribution, λH , which
may not be known even byH a priori, and is hence Markovian.
We now define three central properties of a CAS.
Definition 5.1. Let λH be the stationary distribution of feedback
signals that the human authority follows.
Definition 5.2. Let κH : S ×A→ P(L) be a mapping that maps
state-action pairs to the set of levels of autonomy the human au-
thority will allow the system to operate in with nonzero probability.
Intuitively, κH represents the human authority’s belief of the
agent’s underlying competence. Hence by definition, any level that
is not contained in κH(s,a) will never be approved by the human.
Definition 5.3. Let S be a CAS. The competence of S, denoted
χS , is a mapping from S × A to the optimal (least-cost) level of
autonomy given perfect knowledge of λH . Formally:
χS(s,a) = argmin
l ∈L
q(s, (a, l); λH). (3)
Intuitively, the system’s level of competence for executing action
a in state s is the most beneficial (cost effective) level of autonomy
were it to know exactly the human feedback model. In general,
we expect this to be equal to sup(κH(s,a)), i.e., the highest level
of autonomy allowed by the human, although it need not be the
case always. In principle, the highest allowed level of autonomy
could require more frequent human interventions that may ren-
der it less efficient overall relative to a lower level of autonomy.
That is why we define the optimal level of autonomy based on the
comprehensive expected cost.
It is important to note that this definition of competence relies on
λH , and hence is a definition of competence on the overall human-
agent system, and is explicitly not a measure of the competence of
the underlying agent’s fundamental abilities. A corollary of this
fact is that the CAS is only as competent as the human authority
believes it to be; a human authority that has a poor understanding
of the system’s abilities could lead to the system having a lower
competence than a human authority that knows perfectly the limi-
tations and capabilities of the system.
We now define two final properties of a CAS.
Definition 5.4. Let S be a CAS. S is λ-stationary if for every
state s = (s, l) ∈ S , and every action a ∈ A, the expected value of
sample information (EVSI) on the feedback signals Σ for (s,a) is
less than ϵ for any ϵ greater than 0.
Intuitively, S is λ-stationary if, in expectation, any new feedback
drawn from the true distribution λH will not affect λ enough to
change the optimal level of autonomy for any s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
Definition 5.5. Let S be a CAS. S is level-optimal if for every
state s = (s, l) ∈ S , we have that π∗(s) = a = (a, χS(s,a)). Similarly,
S is ϵ-level-optimal if this holds for 1 − ϵ percent of states.
5.2 Theoretical Results
In this section, we show that under assumptions 1 and 2 as stated
in Section 5.1, if χS(s,a) ∈ κH(s,a) and there is a path from some
level of autonomy in the system’s initial κ(s,a) to χS(s,a) for every
s ∈ S,a ∈ A, then the system’s autonomy profile κ will converge to
its competence regardless of the initialization of λ.
Proposition 5.6. Let λt be the feedback profile after t pieces of
feedback have been received. As t → ∞, if no (s,a) is starved and
{λt } converges in distribution, the autonomy-cognizant system will
converge to λ-stationarity.
Proof. Let s ∈ S and a ∈ A. As s and a are arbitrary and we
assume that no (s,a) is starved, it is sufficient to show that (s,a)
converges to stationarity as t →∞. First, letU (λ, l) be the q-value
of (s,a) under the optimal policy given that our feedback profile is
λ and we execute a in level l . Then
EVSI=
∑
σ ∈Σ
max
l ∈L
∫
Λ
U (λ, l)λ(σ |s,a, l)p(λ)dλ − max
l ∈L
∫
Λ
U (λ, l)p(λ)dλ.
Because {λt } converges in distribution, limt→∞ Pr (|λt − λH | >
ϵ) = 0 ∀ϵ > 0 where λH is the true distribution. Therefore, in the
limit the probability that λ = λH after t steps, pt (λ), defines a Dirac
delta function with point mass centered at λH . Hence we get that,
lim
t→∞EVSI
=
(
lim
t→∞
∑
σ ∈Σ
max
l ∈L
∫
Λ
U (λ, l)λ(σ |s, ∅,a, l)pt (λ)dλ
)
− ( lim
t→∞maxl ∈L
∫
Λ
U (λ, l)pt (λ)dλ
)
=
( ∑
σ ∈σ
max
l ∈L
U (λH , l)λH(σ |s, ∅,a, l)) − (max
l ∈L
U (λH , l))
=
∑
σ ∈Σ
max
l ∈L
U (λH , l)(1 − λH(σ |s, ∅,a, l))
= max
l ∈L
U (λH , l)(1 − ∑
σ ∈Σ
λH(σ |s, ∅,a, l))
= max
l ∈L
U (λH , l)(1 − 1)
= 0. □
Theorem 5.7. Let S be a CAS that follows the gated exploration
strategy for which there exists at least one path from κ0(s,a) to
χS(s,a) in L where all levels along the path are in κH(s,a) for every
(s,a) ∈ S × A. Then given any initial λ0, if no (s,a) is starved and
{λt } converges in distribution, then as t → ∞, S will converge to
level-optimality.
Proof Sketch. By proposition 5.6, under the conditions as stated,
λ will converge to λH . As a result, what is left is to show that in
the limit, π∗(s) = (a,κ(s,a)) for every s ∈ S . Because λ has con-
verged to λH , the system can determine the cost-optimal level of
autonomy for every action a in any state s; this is exactly χS(s,a).
Hence, we must only show that the system will reach this level
under the conditions stated. By the exploration policy, the system
has a nonzero chance of exploring all neighboring levels at any
given point in time, and since L is assumed to have a valid path
from κ0(s,a) to χS(s,a), there is always a nonzero probability of
reaching the optimal level via exploration. At this point, since λ is
converged, exploration will terminate. Hence, we are done. □
5.3 Model Assumptions
We make two assumptions about the human authority,H : (1) that
the human provides consistent feedback, and (2), that the human’s
feedback comes from a stationary, Markovian distribution. We dis-
cuss below practical considerations regarding these assumptions.
Regarding assumption (1), implicit in this assumption is that
humans respond appropriately to each situation, possibly with some
noise representing the likelihood of human error. However, because
of the limited scope of the system’s domain model, it could be that
perfectly consistent feedback fromH ’s perspective is perceived to
be random by the system, particularly when it is not aware of the
domain features that explain the human feedback. As an example,
consider a robot that can open ‘push’ doors, but cannot open ‘pull’
doors. If the robot cannot discriminate between these types of doors,
consistent and correct human feedback (approving autonomously
opening ‘push’ doors only) may be perceived by the robot to be
arbitrary or random. Although in practice one may wish to avoid
such situations, we emphasize that the system will still converge
to its competence – possibly low competence – when the feedback
distribution appears to be random.
Regarding assumption (2) that the human feedback distribution
λH is stationary and Markovian from the start, it implies that the
human has good knowledge of the system from the start. That
may not be realistic. It is more likely that the feedback signals
may very based upon the observed performance of the system
over time. However, as the human authority observes the system’s
performance, their feedback distribution will eventually reach a
stationary point as long as the system’s underlying capabilities
stay fixed. Therefore, even if there are erroneous feedback signals
provided early in this process, in the limit the system will still
converge to its competence. Furthermore, two possible means of
expediting this is to introduce a training phase at the beginning
of the system’s deployment to allow the human to observe the
system’s performance and develop accurate expectations regarding
the system’s capabilities, and to introduce standardized feedback
criteria that is made known to the humans.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented our model in two different problem domains. The
first domain features a campus delivery robot that must learn to
properly navigate a large area featuring several kinds of obsta-
cles. The second domain features an autonomous vehicle that must
learn to properly pass an obstruction in its lane. We begin with a
description of these domains as implemented in our experiments.
Campus Delivery Robot A delivery robot must navigate a campus
to deliver packages from one location to another. An illustration of
the map used in our experiments can be seen in Figure 2. In this
domain there are two categories of potential obstacles for the robot.
The first is a crosswalk that can have differing levels of traffic – no
traffic, light traffic, and heavy traffic. Although not pictured, certain
crosswalks have better visibility than others; however, this is not
modeled by the robot and so it must learn to discriminate using
only human feedback. The second kind of obstacle is a door that the
robot must get through to enter buildings, rooms, or even different
areas of buildings once inside. Doors come in three colors – blue,
green, and red. While the robot can see the colors of the doors, the
Figure 2: Campus delivery robot domain. The robot starts in
a room on campus and must traverse both crosswalks and
doors to reach its goal state. In some cases, the robot may
learn to go around a nearby parking lot rather than take the
crosswalks due to poor visibility and learn to identify doors
that can be opened autonomously.
meaning of these colors changes from building to building and is
unknown to the robot a priori, so the system must once again rely
on human feedback to discriminate between doors it is allowed to
open and and those that is not, in each building on the campus.
Trees, walls, and roads are all avoided by the system completely.
κ(s,a) is initialized to be {0, 1} for all actions in obstacle states. For
states with no obstacles, the system is allowed to operate at level 3.
Autonomous Vehicle Obstacle Passing An autonomous vehicle
(AV) driving on a single-lane road has its lane blocked by an obsta-
cle that can be stopped (e.g. a parked car) or moving (e.g. a large
slow-moving tractor) and is blocking the AV from progressing. To
get around the obstacle, the AV must cross the center lines and
drive into the oncoming traffic’s lane; the AV must reason about
oncoming vehicles that it may not be able to see until it edges into
the oncoming lane, as well as vehicles behind it that may move up
to occupy its space when the AV enters the oncoming lane, at which
point the AV cannot reverse. If the agent moves into the oncoming
lane with an oncoming vehicle that is too close, the oncoming vehi-
cle does not have time to stop and will crash into the AV. However,
the oncoming vehicle may also choose to stop and wait for the
AV to take its turn and pass; while the AV can determine if the
oncoming vehicle is stopped, it must learn that it is allowed to pass
when the oncoming vehicle is waiting for it. Similarly, when the
vehicle behind it takes its space behind the obstacle and it cannot
reverse, the AV must learn to discriminate between situations that
require it to transfer control to a human and situations in which it
can operate autonomously. κ(s,a) is initialized to be {0, 1} in states
where it has not entered into the oncoming lane as it must get
explicit permission to attempt to do so, and {0, 2} in states where
it is in the oncoming lane, as it is no longer safe to stop and wait
for a response, and must instead rely on the human to override and
take control when the situation becomes too dangerous.
(a) Campus delivery robot with a single task. (b) Campus delivery robot with random tasks. (c) Autonomous vehicle obstacle passing.
Figure 3: Level-optimality of the CAS across different subsets of the state space. All states refers to the entire state space.
Visited states are states the system entered at least once during the entire experiment. Reachable states are states reachable by
the policy during that episode. Cumulative signals are the total feedback signals received by the end of each episode. Results
shown are the mean and standard error over 10 trials.
6.1 Campus Delivery Robot
In the campus delivery robot domain, we conducted two experi-
ments. In the first, the start and goal states remained static through-
out all episodes resulting in the starvation of some (unvisited) state-
action pairs. In the second, the start and goal states are randomly
drawn from a collection of rooms throughout the campus map each
episode so that no state-action pair is starved.
Figure 4 plots the mean and standard error of the expected cost of
reaching the goal state in the single task experiment across episodes
averaged over 10 trials. We see that, after an initial spike in the early
episodes, the expected cost steadily decreases towards a steady state
as the agent both learns to more accurately predict human feedback
and updates its autonomy profile towards its competence.
The steady state in the expected cost is consistent with the results
shown in Figure 3a where we see that the agent converges to almost
100% level-optimality by episode 150 for all reachable states. That
is, the agent converges to a level-optimal solution that exploits
its competence and no longer visits most states. Hence the level-
optimality stagnates at ∼90% across all states and all visited states
at this time as well.
Table 1 reports the percent of actions taken at each level of
autonomy over the course of the first 150 episodes. We can see that
by episode 150 the agent goes from requesting approval 45.8% of
the time in the first episode to operating in only no autonomy and
unsupervised autonomy, indicating that the system has learned
to properly exploit where it does or does not need to rely on the
human authority. Note that to accomplish this specific task, it is
not cost-effective to request human assistance in Levels 1 and 2,
hence the agent learns to avoid them. However, this is not a general
pattern we would expect in every domain, but more of a reflection
of the agent’s competence and cost of human assistance in Levels 1
and 2 in this domain.
In the second experiment, the start and goal states are selected
randomly in each episode, representing random tasks that the agent
must complete throughout the entire campus. In this example, the
agent covers a larger portion of the state space, but interacts less
frequently with any given subset of states than it does in the first
experiment. In such a setting, because no state-action pairs are
Figure 4: Campus delivery robot expected cost per episode.
Episode Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
0 12.5 45.8 0.0 41.7
25 25.0 12.5 50.0 12.5
100 18.2 0.0 0.0 81.8
150 12.5 0.0 0.0 87.5
Table 1: Percent of actions taken at each level of autonomy
in the single-task experiment.
starved in the limit, the agent will be guaranteed to converge to
its competence in the limit across the entire environment; how-
ever because some states may be visited very infrequently, this
convergence can take much longer than the 150 episodes it took to
converge to 100% in the first experiment across all reachable states.
As a result, it is even more important that the agent generalizes
what it has learned from prior experience and feedback.
Figure 3b shows the results of this experiment. In particular we
see that by episode 450, the system is operating at close to 100%
level-optimality across the entire state space. While this takes much
longer than the 150 episodes it took to reach 100% level-optimality
across reachable states in the first experiment, we also see that by
episode 150 in this experiment, the system is operating at ∼95%
level-optimality across the entire state space, almost five percent
higher than in the first experiment, and using a similar number
Figure 5: Obstacle passing domain expected cost per episode.
of feedback signals to reach this point. Because the system is able
to optimize its reliance on the human authority across the entire
environment, given a new task that it has not seen before, it would
be able to perform close to optimally from the start.
Also shown in Figures 3a and 3b is the cumulative number of
feedback signals the system has received by the end of each episode.
A natural concern with a system that relies on feedback from a
human is that the process of acquiring that feedback may be too
onerous on the human to make it worthwhile. However, we can
see in these figures that the system only requires ∼275 and ∼375
feedback signals respectively to reach near 100% level-optimality,
with most of the feedback coming from early episodes where the
humanmay be expecting to be more actively involved. Furthermore,
in our case all feedback comes as a result of assistive actions, and
all assistive actions produce feedback; no feedback is given simply
to provide information. This means that we are not introducing
more work for the human supervisor to train the system, but simply
utilizing existing information generated in the course of normal
operation of the semi-autonomous system.
Finally, all results shown are the mean values over 10 trials along
with standard error bars. We can see from the graphs that the stan-
dard error is consistently small across episodes indicating that there
is small variance in the performance of the system, particularly
with respect to the number of feedback signals the system needs to
reach level-optimality in this domain.
6.2 Autonomous Vehicle Obstacle Passing
In the third experiment, an autonomous vehicle (AV) must navigate
around an obstacle that is blocking its lane by moving into the
oncoming lane, which may or may not have traffic. In doing so, the
AV opens the space behind the obstacle to potentially be filled by a
rear vehicle preventing it frommoving back into the space if needed.
It is worth noting that due to the highly safety-critical nature of
this domain, we restrict the system’s capacity to generalize both
the feedback it receives and updates made to its autonomy profile.
As an example, the AV being approved to edge into the oncoming
lane when there is an oncoming vehicle far away has no impact
on the likelihood of approval for edging when there is a vehicle
some other distance away, or no observed vehicle at all. However,
the system is allowed to generalize what it learns across certain
features such as specific map location so it can apply what it learns
to other single-lane locations.
Despite this limitation, because the system interacts more con-
sistently with a larger portion of the state space in each episode,
the results we get are consistent with those in the campus delivery
robot domain. As seen in Figure 5, the expected cost decreases con-
sistently with each episode as the AV learns to predict the human
feedback better and its autonomy profile is updated towards its
competence. In this problem specifically, it so happened that the
system learned that the optimal policy for navigating the obstacle
featured actions solely taken in unsupervised autonomy. Hence at
the point where we see its level-optimality plateau in Figure 3c, the
system is no longer receiving information from the human as it is
exploiting its autonomy model by only taking actions that it can
do fully unsupervised to navigate the obstacle.
Similar to the campus delivery domain, the level-optimality
plateaus at ∼90% across both the entire state space, and states
visited at least once throughout the experiment. This indicates that
∼10% of states in the state space were either never visited, or visited
too rarely for the agent to ever learn enough to converge to level-
optimality in them. More importantly, the system is able to achieve
almost 90% level-optimality with fewer than 60 total feedback sig-
nals, most of which are obtained within the first 20 episodes. This
is desirable when dealing with a safety critical problem domain
that may be encountered infrequently in practice.
7 CONCLUSION
We present a new formal model – competence-aware system –
for decision making in semi-autonomous systems where an au-
tonomous agent can operate at different levels of autonomy, and
must optimize its autonomous operation by learning from direct
feedback signals provided by a human authority. We demonstrated
empirically that the approach enables the system to quickly learn
to operate at its underlying competence in almost all situations,
effectively optimizing its autonomous operation so as to minimize
unnecessary reliance on human intervention. We validated the ben-
efits of CAS across two simulated domains – a campus delivery
robot and an autonomous vehicle – and obtained consistent results
in all three of our experiments.
We provide theoretical results, including a new exploration rule,
gated exploration, for enabling a CAS to safely explore new levels
of autonomy in the presence of a human authority, and a proof
that under normal convergence assumptions, the system is guaran-
teed to converge to its true competence and become level-optimal.
Moreover, we showed that this result holds regardless of how the
feedback profile is initialized.
Future work includes real-world experiments on an autonomous
vehicle prototype with humans. We will also explore how we can
utilize human feedback to identify potential features missing from
the system’s world model, as well as using our model to identify
situations of low autonomy and over-reliance on a human authority.
Finally, we will examine ways to bootstrap competence learning to
facilitate fast convergence when agent capabilities are modified.
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